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ABSTRACT
This research examines the impacts that existing factors can have on the
outcome of natural disasters. In order to study this question more thoroughly than
previous research, this paper conducts a small n study on the Middle America
region through case studies in Mexico, El Salvador, and Haiti. Each of these case
studies are evaluated by their outcomes of severe earthquakes and the conditions
in which these earthquakes occurred. These conditions being: their economies,
governances, and pre-existing natural disaster plans. The analysis of these
indicators attempts to understand why certain countries perform better in natural
disasters compared to others. In a region like Middle America, where natural
disasters are extremely common, what can countries do to reduce their losses in
fatalities and monetary damages?

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Research Question
Literature Review

4
4
6

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
Methodology
Death Toll, Affected Population, and Monetary Damages Variables
Governance
Economic Variable
Disaster Planning Variable

10

CHAPTER THREE: FINDINGS
Mexico City, Mexico Earthquake 1985
Background
Governance
Economy
Disaster Planning
San Salvador, El Salvador 1986
Background
Governance
Economy
Disaster Planning
Haiti 2010
Background
Governance
Economy
Disaster Planning

17

CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Analysis
Governance
Economy
Disaster Planning
Implications for the International Community

37

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY
Summary of Findings
Conclusions

48

10
12
13
14
15

17
17
18
19
20
21
21
23
24
25
27
27
29
31
32

37
39
41
44
46

48
50

4

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Research Question
The Latin American and the Caribbean region is the second most prone
region in the world for natural disasters1. While there is an abundance of research
that examines this phenomena ecologically.2,3 There is little research into the
man-made aspects that can work in tandem with natural forces to create
catastrophes. Specifically, these main aspects are the economic, political, and
disaster planning elements that can determine the severity of a natural disaster.
Latin American countries seem to have many similarities in these elements,
especially in comparison to other regions. However, some countries in this region
have suffered much greater impacts from natural disasters than other countries in
the region. This poses the question of why some countries that seem to share
similarities in these relevant areas are impacted less by natural disasters of similar
caliber than others.
This research investigates the effects that governments, the economy, and
pre-disaster preparedness and prevention have on the impact of natural disasters
using three case studies: the Mexico City, Mexico 1985 earthquake, the San
Salvador, El Salvador 1986 earthquake, and the 2010 Port-au-Prince, Haiti
earthquake. It seeks to learn from some of the most devastating natural disasters
in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, or the “Middle America” region
that struggles with a high susceptibility to many kinds of natural disasters, lack of

1

Gencer, “Overview of Urban Vulnerability”, 2
Hardoy and Pandiella, "Urban Poverty and Vulnerability."
3
Reguero et al., "Climate Change on Exposure to Coastal Flooding"
2
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economic growth, and poor governance. When deciding what specific natural
disaster would be the focal point of the study, earthquakes were chosen because of
their high mortality rates and costly economic impact. Therefore, in-depth
research into case studies of earthquakes in this region in addition to the existing
natural disaster research could provide answers for other kinds of natural disasters
that have less devastating effects.
This research chooses three case studies rather than a wide study of the
region because natural disaster recoveries are very complex. Including the use of
case study analysis allows for a deeper examination into the qualitative drivers
behind the quantitative data presented and allows a story to emerge that results in
a more complete study of the selected country both pre and post disaster.
Additionally, including this qualitative commentary offers insight into the disaster
preparedness or plan of each country and how well that plan was instituted
following the earthquake.
This research has the hopes to provide more insight into the elements that
can impact the level of devastation of earthquakes, and more broadly all natural
disasters, in the Central American and Caribbean region. This region, which
receives large amounts of aid from external organizations, could be assisted more
effectively if there was more insight into how these countries could better mitigate
and respond to natural disasters.4

4

Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, 21
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Literature Review
Several reports from the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research (MCEER) point to poor construction and lack of
earthquake resistance building codes as reasons that the impacts of many
earthquakes were exacerbated.5 Some of these preventable measures include
implementing construction regulations, regulating construction near fault zones,
and licensing for contractors, engineers and architects. Whereas, other cases did
not lack regulation, they lacked incentives to abide by these regulations,
especially in lowly populated and poorer areas. So what prevented these countries
from creating or implementing disaster prevention methods?
Anbarci et al. says that the lack of collective action is the obstacle in
enacting disaster prevention and planning.6 The creation of disaster prevention
methods and the action of the people implementing the precautionary regulation
that MCEER discusses is what Anbarci et al. describes as collective action in
natural disaster preparedness. Their research shows that richer countries and
countries with lower levels of inequality have less fatalities in earthquakes than
poorer countries which they attribute to a positive correlation between collective
action and GDP.7 According to their theory, “The ability of a country to pursue
such collective action is, however, limited by its income and the ability of the
population to arrive at an agreeable distribution of the economic burden of the
actions”.8 Their research found that there were 85% and 167% more fatalities in

5

MCEER
Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register, "Earthquake Fatalities", 1908
7
Anbarci, 1910
8
Anbarci, 1909
6
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poorer and unequal countries respectively than wealthier and more equal countries
in instances where they were both hit by earthquakes of nearly identical
magnitudes.9 Although one can infer from the results of the empirical model that
GDP per capita and inequality are correlated with earthquake preparedness,
Anabarci et al. does not have the data to confirm their theoretical model that
income and equality work together to determine a country’s level of collective
action in the form of earthquake preparedness.
Other research has supported Anbarci et al.’s argument that poorer
countries experience a disproportionate amount of fatalities due to natural
disasters compared to wealthier countries. Kahn dismisses the argument that this
is because poorer countries experience an unequal amount of natural disasters
compared to richer countries.10 His research finds that poor nations suffer the
same quantity and quality of natural disasters, but that on average poorer
countries experience an increase of 5.3% in earthquake fatality rates for every ten
percent decrease in GDP.11 Kahn hypothesizes that this can be attributed to better
construction and natural disaster planning in rich countries. However, without a
deeper study into the specific construction practices and natural disaster plans of
the countries used in his study, Kahn still cannot have concrete evidence to
explain why higher GDPs result in less devastation in the instance of natural
disasters. 12 So what are these richer countries doing to minimize fatalities caused

9

Anbarci, 1922
Kahn, "Role of Income, Geography, and Institutions", 271
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Kahn, 278
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Kahn, 283
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by natural disasters? What kinds of resources are they able to afford that poorer
countries cannot?
There is limited research into why some natural disaster prevention and
mitigation plans are successful and others are not. This is why it is difficult for
researchers like Kahn and Anbarci et al. to prove their theories. It is mostly
unknown what wealthy countries devote resources to in order to become more
successful at preventing and mitigating disaster. In his article, Agility and
Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response, Harrald is one of the
few to discuss the necessary elements for creating a disaster response plan as well
as the post-disaster implementation of disaster plans. Previous literature claims
that there is a trade-off between command and control elements in mobilizing and
managing a large organization in order to ensure broad coordination and
communication. However, Harrald disagrees that these trade-offs are a definite
reality of disaster recovery. He argues that disaster response plans should be
designed in order to handle adaptative situations, while also maintaining a strong
structure within the organizational systems.13 The main goal, according to
Harrald, of disaster response planning is to formulate a plan to “prepare for,
respond to, and recover from extreme events in ways that minimize the disruption
to and maximize the resiliency of our social and economic systems”.14 Using
Harrald’s factors to success for natural disaster response, countries in the Middle
America region might be able to partner with multilateral aid organizations and
development banks to invest in preparedness for natural disasters.
13
14

Harrald, "Critical Success Factors", 257
Harrald, 257
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The research previously mentioned suggests that poorer countries suffer
higher rates of mortalities because they do not view allocating resources towards
disaster response preparedness as the highest priority. This is due to the fact that
resources are few and the payoffs of preparedness mechanisms are sometimes
never seen. However, if poorer countries can implement disaster preparedness that
is effective without putting financial pressures on their population, they are able
to reduce the lack of collection action that Anbarci et al. describes as an obstacle
to effective disaster response.15 However, unless governments, especially in
poorer countries, have guidance on what mechanisms are effective, they are not
going to risk wasting their resources.

15

Anbarci, 1907
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL ARGUMENT
Methodology
Noting that Latin America, especially Central America and the Caribbean
has struggled economically and politically in the past, this research began by
investigating how these countries dealt with the impact of natural disasters. Did
the previous research hold true for this region as well; did wealthier Central
American and Caribbean countries have lower mortality rates for natural
disasters? As previous literature briefly mentions16,17, it could be suspected that
political elements have a role in natural disaster responses. This research chose to
also investigate the role governance plays in natural disaster responses along with
economic factors due to the lack of previous literature surrounding it. Three case
studies were chosen in order to be able to provide significant quantitative research
on each. This quantitative evidence serves to support the qualitative data in this
study, along with that in previous research, and provide a more clear link between
the data and the theories behind it. The three case studies from Mexico, El
Salvador, and Haiti were chosen because although they have shared some of the
same general political and financial struggles, they have very different histories
regarding their governments and economies. These specific instances of
earthquakes in 1985 in Mexico, 1986 in El Salvador, and 2010 in Haiti were
selected because each of these earthquakes registered as 6+ magnitude on the
Ritcher scale which qualifies them as severe earthquakes. As previous research
has suggested, although it could be inferred through their results, they lacked the
16
17

Anbarci, 1918
Kahn, 280-283
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specifics of each country’s natural disaster preparedness. This is because
investigating every country’s natural preparedness plan involved in their studies
would have proved an almost impossible task. Therefore, they had no way to
confirm that collective action is the causal mechanism that explains how wealthier
and more equal countries have fewer fatalities from earthquakes. In order to
continue the study of these specific causal mechanisms, this research conducts a
small n study on three countries that were affected by earthquakes of similar
magnitude. Only a few case studies were chosen in order to be able to allow for
more detailed evidence to support this theoretical model that economic variables
impact the severity of a natural disaster because they are linked to the likelihood
of collective action through natural disaster preparedness. This research
incorporates two other variables, governance and disaster planning to further
support these theories.
Due to the lack of natural disaster literature that combines both
quantitative and qualitative data, it was crucial that this research would use a
combination of both in order to fill this gap in the literature. Additionally, this
research studies the element of governance with regard to natural disaster
response in these three case studies. This variable was added in order to improve
the hypothesis that collective action needed for natural disaster planning is
motivated only through economics. However, this research investigated the idea
that governments can influence the effectiveness of disaster response plans and
ultimately mortality rates, number of people affected, and monetary damages in
addition to economies. They are able to have this influence through their

12

allocation of resources and whether they choose to enforce disaster response
mechanisms. This research also expands on previous research by including
monetary damage and affected population data in addition to fatalities. However,
it is important to control for both the population size of the affected area when
analyzing fatalities as well as the country’s GDP when analyzing monetary
damages.
Death Toll, Affected Population, and Monetary Damages Variables
The number of fatalities is the common variable used to measure the
impact of a natural disaster. While this variable alone can provide decent insight
into the severity of the impact of a natural disaster, it cannot illustrate the situation
entirely. The death toll can provide insight into the devastation in the immediate
wake of a natural disaster, but the number of affected people and the damages that
are done to their surroundings can be indicative of the struggles that the country
will suffer in the long term. Therefore, this study sought a more detailed approach
than previous studies with the addition of affected population and monetary
damages variables. In this study, affected people are categorized as “those that
required immediate assistance during a period of emergency i.e. requiring basic
survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate medical
assistance.” In some cases, the affected population becomes displaced for an
extended period of time. This is why it is important that countries not only try to
prevent fatalities, but also try to mitigate the number of affected people and
monetary damages in order to avoid long lasting effects.

13

The data for the death tolls, affected population, and monetary damages
was gathered from the EM-DAT database. This database is compiled by the
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters using various sources,
including UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies,
research institutes and press agencies. 18 Although measuring death tolls and
monetary damages is not a holistic way of measuring the severity of the disaster,
this research provides in-depth qualitative evidence to support it. In this research,
the percentage of the population in the affected areas and GDP are also taken into
consideration when comparing the death tolls and monetary damages. Although
the death toll or monetary damages in one country may look less severe than
another, when measured to the population and GDP, it is easy to see the impact of
the disaster relatively. Poorer countries suffer worse effects, especially
monetarily, even when statistics seem to show them as being impacted less than
developed countries. This is due to higher levels of the population of poorer
countries living closer to subsistence level and their infrastructure being less
developed, and therefore, less expensive. This research attempts to supplement
the quantitative data of each case study with qualitative data about the overall
situation in the country, which may have had an effect on how the natural disaster
impacted the country.
Governance
Previous studies have investigated very little into the role that
governments play in natural disasters. The existing studies have mostly focused

18

Centre for Research
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on the role of equality as it pertains to natural disasters19, 20. However, this
research seeks to investigate deeper into the specific governmental institutions
that existed in these three countries at the time of the earthquakes. This research
seeks to explore the role that good governance can have in facilitating effective
response plans pre and post-disaster. On the other hand, it also investigates the
role that bad governance, whether it be in the form of corruption, conflict, etc.,
has on natural disaster response. This variable will rely solely on qualitative
research since there is no data available for governance indicators that is
consistent for all three countries.
Economic Variable
Although theoretical models that link economic variables with natural
disaster death tolls exist, they lack the qualitative research to confirm their
argument. This research provides the background on each country’s economy at
the time of the earthquake for a more complex understanding of the context
behind the data. There is a limited amount of economincal quantitative data that is
available for all the three countries studied in this research. This is mostly
hindered by the lack of data on the two older case studies, Mexico in 1985 and El
Salvador in 1986. Without equal data to use to compare these three case studies
economically, the analysis on available data would be skewed. However, GDP is
a reliable variable that can be used to give a base comparison of the data.
Although GDP is a widely used and understood variable, it does not encompass

19
20

Anbarci
Kahn
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all of the elements that are important to this research. Therefore, I will supplement
the GDP variable with qualitative data from the unique case studies. By
combining GDP with qualitative data, this research aims at illustrating a robust
argument about the effects that an existing economy can have on the ability of a
nation to recover from a natural disaster quickly and effectively in a way that
minimizes deaths and damages.
Disaster Planning Variable
Although some might assume that countries with a higher frequency of
natural disasters would know how to mitigate the impact of a disaster better than
those with low frequencies, previous research has found that the frequency of
earthquakes did not have a significant relationship to the number of fatalities in an
earthquake.21 Research has also found that poorer countries did not experience
more natural disasters compared to richer countries.22 Therefore, a successful
mitigation of the impact of an earthquake and an effective initial response is
directly related to prior intentional planning and not to learned strategies due to
high frequencies of a natural disaster. Also, richer countries do not have lower
mortality rates because they have lower frequencies of natural disasters, but rather
because they plan more effectively.
This paper focuses on the effects that are the result of what Harrald would
categorize as the Preparedness and Prevention and Initial Reaction and
Mobilization phases. This paper does not focus on the phases past the Initial
Reaction and Mobilization phase because the next phase, Organizational
21
22

Anbarci, 1926
Kahn, 275
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Integration, is where external actors, which were not coordinated pre-disaster, are
brought into the response efforts. This paper chooses to focus on the response
from the country itself and the effectiveness of its predetermined response efforts,
rather than the role that external organizations that step up post-disaster play.
However, this does not include external organizations that have a premeditated
role in a country’s natural disaster plan.

Figure 123

In this research, the Preparedness and Prevention and Initial Reaction and
Mobilization phases of each case study will be evaluated on the criteria shown in
Figure 1. This study argues that if Middle American and Caribbean countries
know how to more effectively mitigate damages from natural disasters, they
would be more likely to invest in emergency management. Therefore, this
research investigates if any of these factors could prove to be effective for future
disaster response efforts through the study of Mexico, El Salvador, and Haiti.

23

Harrald, 262
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CHAPTER THREE: FINDINGS
Mexico City, Mexico Earthquake 1985
Background
The 8.1 earthquake that occurred in Mexico on September 19, 1985
affected Mexico’s most populated city.24 At the time, its population was estimated
to be 18 million people.25 Mexico City is not only the capital city but also the hub
to Mexico’s educational and financial institutions, mass media outlets, and
industrial and commercial establishments26. For these reasons, Mexico City was
differentiated from all other Mexican municipalities through the creation of The
Department of the Federal District (DDF).27 Therefore, Mexico City relied
heavily on federal authority to govern their district including the emergency
response plans that were prepared for the city.28 The federal government’s
emergency response plan at the time of the earthquake was titled DN-3.29
Immediately after the earthquake hit, the President gave instruction that
emergency measures be taken and response efforts detailed in DN-3 begin.30
However, it is speculated that the civilian government was wary about
relinquishing control to the military, due to Mexico’s former oppressive military
regimes.31 Starting in the 1980s until only a few years before the earthquake in
1982, the government in conjunction with the military carried out a vicious

24

National Geophysical Data Center, The Earthquake in Mexico City, 1
National Geophysical Data Center, 1
26
Dynes, "Response to the 1985 Earthquake", 20
27
Dynes 20
28
Dynes, 21
29
Dynes, 21
30
Dynes, 30
31
Robinson, et al. “The Mexico City earthquake”, 113
25
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counterinsurgency campaign against government opponents.32 This confusion
over control caused a lack of interorganizational communication between
municipal civilian officials and federal officials over who had the control over
certain responsibilities in the response efforts.33 Later, control was given to
impromptu emergency response coordinating committees that were created by the
President in the two days following the earthquake.34
Governance
At the time of the earthquake, Miguel de la Madrid was president35. He
was part of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) party and had never held
elective office before.36 While he was inexperienced, he benefited by running a
campaign that stuck to liberal values such as mass equality and representation for
Mexico’s middle and lower classes.37 By utilizing this strategy, he was wildly
popular with his constituency which led to one of the largest voter turnouts the
country had seen up to that point.38 A string of PRI party presidents that were
popular with the working class, the peasantry, and government workers pushed
the country towards industrialization and economic reform which caused a period
of roughly forty years that were of largely peaceful and productive years for the
country when compared to their Central American neighbors.39

32

Forero, “Mexico’s Dirty Wars”
Dynes, 29
34
Dynes, 31
35
Zarate, "Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado"
36
Zarate
37
Zarate
38
Zarate
39
Storrs, "Mexico's Political History", 2
33
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Economy
Three years before the earthquake in 1982, Mexico had a debt crisis.40
Mexico’s economy had become dependent on foreign exchange and fiscal
abundance due to high oil prices during the 1970-1980s; however, in 1981, oil
prices started to fall and Mexico’s financial deficit reached 14.1% of the GDP,
nearly double from 1980.41 The country also had a large amount of foreign debt
which was not seen as problematic when the interest rates were low but became
detrimental to the economy once these rates started to rise.42 However, according
to Moreno-Brid et al. “The size and speed of Mexico’s external adjustment to the
debt crisis was outstanding in the Latin American context”.43 Mexico addressed
its trade balance within a year, turning its US$3.8 billion trade deficit into a
US$7.1 billion surplus.44 This surplus increased in 1983, reaching US$14.1
billion.45 In order to pay its foreign debt, Mexico knew that it was unrealistic to
expect nonoil export industries to generate this revenue.46 Therefore, Mexico
successfully cut its imports drastically and reduced its domestic spending in order
to pay the debt it had accrued.47 This was successful because intermediate and
capital good imports had contributed more than 70% to the nonoil trade balance

40

Buffie and Krause, "Stabilizing Development to the Debt Crisis", 148
Buffie and Krause, 148
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Moreno-Brid and Ros, "Mexican Economy: A Historical Perspective", 145
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Moreno-Brid and Ros, 147
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Moreno-Brid and Ros, 145
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Moreno-Brid and Ros, 147
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Moreno-Brid and Ros, 146
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Moreno-Brid and Ros, 146
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which was a contributing factor to the debt crises.48 In the years leading up to the
earthquake, Mexico’s economy was rebounding from the 1983 debt crisis.
Disaster Planning
As previously discussed, the Mexican federal government had a plan for natural
disasters called DN-3 (or SME-3 by the Navy).49 This delegated the responsibility
of disaster response to the Mexican army.50 The plan was to be enacted after the
president declared a state of emergency.51 Although certain U.S. organizations
such as the National Association of Search and Rescue offered their assistance
upon hearing the news, President de la Madrid initially made the statement that
the country would be able to manage the disaster relying only on internal
resources.52 The Mexican military’s control of human and material resources was
a crucial factor in the federal response to earlier disasters outside of the capital
city.53 Their response to earlier disaster shows that the Mexican response plan had
access to adequate resources that could be available for initial response in high
threat areas.54 Due to their prior experience with this plan outside of Mexico City,
the military had a basis for how to respond to natural disasters based on realistic
scenarios, although the Mexico City earthquake was much more of a devastating
disaster than the Mexican military had previously seen.55 However, where
communication and coordination was disrupted was the interorganizational

48

Moreno-Brid and Ross, 149
Dynes, 21
50
Dynes, 21
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Dynes, 23
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Comfort, "International Disaster Assistance", 23
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preplanning between the federal district of Mexico City and the Mexican federal
government.56 Prior to the 1985 earthquake the situation in Mexico City could be
described as one of extreme organizational complexity and a relatively
decentralized metropolitan government that had a limited response plan at the
metropolitan level.57 However, this was alongside a massive pool of human and
material resources at the federal level that could be potentially employed or used
in mass emergencies.58 Although the military had never encountered a disaster of
the same magnitude as they did in 1985 in Mexico City, they had previous
training that prepared them for a similar scenario.59 President de la Madrid took
further action after the earthquake after implementing DN-3. He was able to have
situational awareness of the destruction and affected areas through multiple
helicopter and bus tours around the city after the impact.60 The blueprint for
immediate reaction accompanied by the situational awareness was crucial to this
initial effort.
San Salvador, El Salvador 1986
Background
On October 10th 1986 a 6.2 earthquake hit the capital of El Salvador, San
Salvador, at 11:49 am local time.61 During this time, the nation of El Salvador
was in the midst of a civil war.62 In addition to this, the country was experiencing
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crop failures due to drought and rising inflation.63 Due to a limited economy and
lack of governmental resources, El Salvador was unable to implement or enforce
the most modern building codes.64 An estimated half of lower income housing in
El Salvador at this time was constructed without the approval of any government
official or inspected for regulation violations.65 The population of San Salvador
was 1,500,000 at the time of the earthquake.66 In response to the earthquake, the
government established the National Emergency Committee (COEN) headed by
President Jose Napoleon Duarte.67 The President did not allow aid to be accepted
from certain countries, due to political reasons.68 The poor, who mostly live in
shantytowns, in San Salvador were the most greatly affected.69 Due to the
unorganized response efforts, aid was not handed out in an even fashion.70 Aid
trucks would arrive at the shantytowns unannounced to distribute relief on a firstcome first-serve basis, which meant that those who lived higher on the slopes of
the shantytowns and further away from the roads did not receive aid.71 During the
earthquake, water lines, electric supply systems, and telecommunication systems
were severely damaged.72 Additionally, while tankers were able to deliver potable
water, the damaged water lines left people without running water and disrupted
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Bommer and Ledbetter, 88
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sewerage systems.73 This, and the disruption of hospitals, resulted in an increase
of diseases, particularly cholera. 74
Governance
As mentioned before, El Salvador was in the midst of a civil war that
ravaged the country as both the military led junta and the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front (FMLN) battled for control of the country’s future.75
The inequality in El Salvador, when combined with the inhumane treatment of
protesters, common election fraud, and the rise of death squads spurred a
resistance which eventually led to the formation of the FMLN.76 This time period
also marked the start of various crimes against humanity from the military led
junta and the government as thousands of people from suspected communists to
Catholic priests were killed for speaking out against the government.77 Due to the
civil war, the country, while it had resources in place that were ready for
mobilization, was very unorganized in the distribution of those resources leading
to some citizens benefitting more than others in the aftermath of the earthquake.78
The ongoing conflict was in its seventh year by the time of the 1986 earthquake,
and it only served to complicate getting aid out to Salvadoran citizens who needed
it the most.79 President Duarte and the Salvadoran government declared a state of
emergency that briefly interrupted fighting as the government attempted to help
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those who had been injured and assessed the property damage that had taken
place.80
Economy
Although El Salvador’s economy had grown during the 1960s and 1970s,
the civil war, which started in 1980 and wasn’t resolved until a peace agreement
in 1992, damaged the economy more than it had grown during these decades. 81
During the 1980s, El Salvador’s economy slowed to an average of 1.3 percent in
growth each year.82 During this decade, there was capital flight, a reluctance to
invest, reduced production, lack of credit, inflated prices of imports, and
depressed prices of principal exports such as coffee, sugar, and cotton.83 Other
contributing factors were the decline in Salvadoran exports caused by a
disadvantageous global economy and an overvaluation of the national currency.
El Salvador also had to deal with the impacts of the civil war, which caused a loss
of confidence, political uncertainty, and destruction.84 One of the tactics from the
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in the civil war was to sabotage the
economy through the destruction of workplaces. Some of El Salvador’s primary
exports including cotton, sugar, and coffee had decreased by fifty, thirty, and
twenty-three percent respectively by 1982. United States Ambassador, Deane R.
Hinton estimated that US$740 million had left El Salvador from 1979 to 1982 and
El Salvador’s Planning Minister, Atilio Vieytez, said he believed this amount to
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be twice as large.85 During the war, the only increases that El Salvador saw to its
economy came from U.S. economic aid and remittances from expatriates that had
fled the country.86 In order to maintain El Salvador’s economy at zero growth, the
U.S., in the form of grants and long-term loans, and international lending
institutions gave El Salvador a combined US$392.5 million.87 When asked about
this economic aid in an interview, President of the Central Bank, Alberto Benitez
Bonilla, said, “If we didn’t have this aid almost all our industries would stop, and
we would have at least 20 percent negative growth”.88 The U.S. also tried to
provide economic assistance in the form of encouragement of economic
reforms.89 However, steps had to be taken to prevent this economic aid from
being distributed based on personal connections, rather than credit-worthiness or a
genuine need for financing which was common in Salvadoran banking practices.90
El Salvador’s ongoing civil war and the overall unfavorable global and regional
economic environment left almost no chance for El Salvador to grow its economy
during this period.
Disaster Planning
Although El Salvador is prone to disasters, it did not have an official
institution to deal with natural disasters.91 This created problems during the 1986
earthquake with communication and mobilization. In regard to the country’s
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response to the earthquake one diplomat said, “They are still fighting a war. When
the earthquake first hit, they still felt a need to protect the country from
guerillas.”92 As part of their prior disaster response plan, the Salvadoran
government had developed relationships with external organizations that assumed
specific roles within the nation’s disaster efforts. The most prominent groups were
the Church Emergency Committee (CIE) and the Union Nacional Trabajadores
(UNTS), a trade union confederation.93 The aid that was sent to El Salvador was
actually not addressed to the Salvadoran government, but rather to these two
organizations.94 However, the government did have a say in what aid entered the
country.95 This complicated the inflow of aid from international actors because
the Salvadoran government refused to accept aid from certain countries due to
political reasons.96 For example, fifteen planes carrying emergency aid from U.S.
organizations and that were intended for the CIE were denied from landing by the
Salvadoran government.97 Some aid, in the form of medical supplies, from Cuba
was accepted. 98 However, a Cuban team of forty medical specialists that were sent
with the supplies were denied from entering El Salvador by the government.99 A
spokesperson from the Salvadoran government explained this by saying that the
government did not want to acquire an oversupply of unnecessary medicines, and
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that the government wanted to be able to supervise the use of medical supplies.100
This illustrated that although there was coordination between the government and
external organizations, power was not totally given to these institutions to make
executive decisions about the recovery process. This created a power struggle and
slowed down the initial disaster response. Although these external organizations
were given the task of managing the incoming aid, they were not authorized to
distribute the aid at first.101 However, after there were complaints that the
government was limiting the amount of assistance that the external organizations
could provide, the Salvadoran government granted the National Emergency
Committee (COEN), which was in charge of these external organizations, the
ability to distribute the aid they had received.102
Haiti 2010
Background
The 2010 Haitian earthquake of 7.0 magnitude occurred at 4:53 pm local
time on November 12th.103 In 2010, Haiti was the poorest country in the Western
hemisphere.104 Only a small portion of the population had access to potable water
before the earthquake and only about a third of the population had intermittent
access to electricity.105 These factors indicate that Haiti was already not in a stable
place where it could effectively deal with a devastating natural disaster.
Additionally, Haiti’s only natural disaster plan was concentrated on hurricanes,
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not earthquakes.106 In 2010, Haiti had not experienced a major earthquake in
many decades and its hurricane preparation actually worsened the impact of the
2010 earthquake. Haiti’s main attempt at hurricane preparation was to build
concrete buildings.107 However, the heaviness of these structures was eventually
harmful to those that became trapped in buildings after the earthquake and could
not escape the heavy rubble.108 The government and The United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was a main actor involved
with disaster response planning prior to the earthquake, were heavily affected by
the earthquake because their buildings were destroyed.109 The presidential palace
and MINUSTAH’s headquarters suffered great damages and key staff died.110
This made it even more difficult for the Haitian government and MINUSTAH to
provide effective response efforts to affected areas after the earthquake.111 The US
government eventually became a primary actor in the post-disaster recovery but
was unable to coordinate assistance until eight days after the initial earthquake.112
Although the damages and casualties suffered within the Haitian government
made it even harder for it to respond to this disaster, the Haitian government’s
lack of creation of a disaster response institution prior to the earthquake was a
major factor that contributed to its inefficiencies in its disaster recovery.113 Haiti
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also had a lack of disaster recovery participation from the Haitian population.114
This could be attributed to the fact that most people were affected by the disaster
and were therefore tending to their own needs.115 However, the surrounding
communities outside Port au Prince did not offer much assistance. According to
Hou and Shi, this was due to the areas outside Port au Prince being poorer than
the capital and not being able to offer much help.116 The economic losses that
were caused by this earthquake were particularly devastating for Haiti because the
damage mostly impacted the population’s ability to acquire basic necessities; and
therefore, the disaster had a significant impact on the survival of the Haitian
people for years after.117, 118 To this day, many of the survivors of the 2010
earthquake still live in refugee camps outside of Port-au-Prince and don’t have
access to clean water, sanitation, or food.119
Governance
For years Haiti has struggled with maintaining peace and order through
governance.120 Ongoing corruption had resulted in an election boycott in 2000.121
In recent years at the time of the earthquake, there had been multiple coups to
overthrow the Haitian president.122 Every election has accusations of election
fraud, and there have been strong tensions between political parties that
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sometimes result in violence. In December 2001, the National Palace was
attacked by thirty heavily armed commandos.123 Although unsuccessful, this
increased tensions between the president and opposition.124 Supporters of
President Aristide burned the opposition’s headquarters and the homes of
opposition leaders.125 Then, the pro-government supporters began an attack on
supporters of the opposition, specifically targeting journalists.126 Eventually,
private news and radio stations closed due to threats.127 This time was marked by
demonstrations, marches, fighting and killing.128 The effects of these were
worsened due to the shortage of police.129 Even worse, many of the police were
appointed because of their political connections and were not trained.130 This
made the police force corrupt and uninterested in quelling the violence of the
frequent uprisings.131 In December 2003, the President sent gang members into
the University of Haiti and severely injured students and staff.132 This incited
student demonstrations of up to 10,000 people.133 These demonstrations and
violence continued, and by the end of 2003, Aristide’s political party started to
fall apart. Things started to change in February 2003, when the opposition began
their rebellion that eventually forced out Aristide by the end of that month.134 This
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marked the beginning of a changing period in Haitian politics, and in February of
2006 Haitians went to the polls and elected Rene Preval to the presidency.135
Preval represented a new government that would work to better the lives of the
Haitian working class and the popular sectors through liberal reforms to help the
average Haitian and bring the country out of poverty.136
Economy
After Aristide was forced out of office, a military regime took his place
that had severe consequences on the Haitian economy.137 During the reign of the
military regime headed by Raoul Cedras, real income per capita decreased by an
estimated thirty percent, Haiti’s crucial assembly industry was reduced by eightyfive percent, and prices of essential goods, oil, and gas prices skyrocketed.138
During this period, unemployment rose and Haiti’s signature coffee exports fell
by one-third.139 This resulted in Haiti defaulting on public debt payments which
caused a flight in capital, a deficit, and depreciation of the local currency.140
Before the 2010 earthquake, Haiti already relied heavily on international
assistance as it had for many years.141 Sixty-five percent of the country’s national
budget relied on assistance from external donors including non-governmental
organizations and bilateral and multilateral donors.142 For these reasons, Haiti’s
economic development strategy was heavily influenced by the economic ideology
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and needs of their donors, which entailed economic liberalism and an exportdriven economy.143 The objectives of Haiti’s foreign investors mostly centered
around Haitian exports.144 However, Haiti’s economic dependence on these
export markets made it vulnerable to the fluctuations of demand for these
commodities, natural and human obstacles to producing food, and international
sanctions against Haiti.145 Unfortunately, the demand for Haiti’s traditional
exports have severely declined or has disappeared altogether.146 The military
regime from 1991-1994 also contributed to the decline of this industry. The
assembly export industry that was popular before this regime, severely decreased
after their time in office and by 2005 it only employed about 20,000-30,000
people.147 The other sectors of Haiti’s economy have also decreased.148 Poor
agricultural practices have shrunk the profits and production possibilities in the
agricultural sector of Haiti’s economy.149 This created a very grave situation in
Haiti which not only limited their economic capabilities but also added to the
severity of the shortages and price inflation of food which peaked in 2008.150 This
made Haiti’s poor vulnerable in many ways.
Disaster Planning
Some may assume that Haiti’s infrequent occurrences of earthquakes
contributed to the massive losses that it suffered. However, the lack of
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relationship between the frequency of earthquakes to the number of fatalities
mentioned above disproves this argument.151 Therefore, other countries that had a
higher frequency of earthquakes did not have an advantage over Haiti, whose last
devastating earthquake before the instance in 2010 was in 1946. Haiti also had
very limited data collection and monitoring capabilities at the time of the 2010
earthquake. They did not have any structured national early warning system for
natural disasters.152 At the local level, Haiti’s risk assessment had greatly
improved in the years leading up to the 2010 earthquake.153 However, this only
resulted in rudimentary risk maps based on limited available data.154 Although
several data collection and monitoring systems were operational, they did not
provide the necessary coverage for natural disaster early warning systems.155
Haiti’s National Meteorological Center relied on two weather-monitoring stations
and a network of volunteer observers from around the country.156 However, this
was not directly related to Haiti’s weather monitoring needs, but rather to provide
data to the United States’ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
National Weather Service.157 To analyze the mobilization capacity and
capabilities, there needs to be a closer look at the structure of Haiti’s National
Disaster Risk Management Plan (NDRMP). This plan is structured to be
decentralized from the national government and focuses on disaster management
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plans at a local level. Strengthening local communities individually, rather than
bolstering a large national organization was the strategy of Haiti’s natural disaster
plan.158 In order to enact this plan within each community, the NDRMS created
an extensive network of Disaster Risk Management (DMR) committees (CDRM)
at all ten departmental levels and in most of the 165 municipalities.159 Although
this could be an effective plan in theory, the network of DMR committees was
limited by the lack of legal decentralization of disaster recovery from the national
government.160 Although the majority of countries use their military as a
mechanism for security and resource mobilization after a natural disaster, Haiti’s
only security force has been the police since the military disbandment in 1994.161
However, the police did not mobilize after the earthquake, possibly because they
were part of the severely impacted population or because they did not know their
specific role within the NDRMS.162 According to Hou and Shi, “Two weeks after
the earthquake, only 3,433 policemen from the 6,000 from the area of Port-auPrince had responded to the government’s call”.163 Referring to Haiti’s response
plan the World Bank said, “most line ministries do not have the legal mandate,
strategic framework or technical capacity to effectively fulfill their DRR (Disaster
Risk Reduction) role and responsibilities as defined within the NDRMP.”164
Although ten ministries and the Haitian Red Cross signed the NDRMP, the
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Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales (MICT), which is part of
the executive body of the Haitian government, is the only entity that has a clear
mandate from DRR.165 Due to the lack of clarity in the organization of the official
disaster response, The World Bank claims that it, “makes it difficult to allocate
financial resources and limits the involvement of the signatory ministries at the
institutional level.”166 Due to this, the NDRMS started to rely more on the local
committees to coordinate plans within their own jurisdictions without much
support from the NDRMS itself or the institutional support at the national level.167
However, this limits the capacity and capability of the disaster response systems
because local committees have less access to resources and this also severely
limits the human capital needed in the initial response period.168 If the immediate
response teams are all local they are less capable of mobilizing since they are
likely part of the affected population. Additionally, the lack of funding limits the
capacity and capability of the local committees. As mentioned before, Haiti’s
disaster response plan is limited by the amount of human capital.169 This also
applies to the amount of trained personnel that is available in the country. There is
a limited number of people with strategic and technical expertise in disaster
management.170 The lack of trained personnel is a severe limitation to the number
of adequate resources that would be available to high threat areas. Additionally,
Haiti has many high threat areas. Due to deforestation and lack of adequate
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construction, around 96% of the Haitian population is at risk in the event of a
natural disaster.171
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Analysis
Details of the specific case studies are helpful in understanding the data of
the three case studies. While Anbarci and Kahn’s research used data to explain
theoretical models, this research aims at providing qualitative evidence to provide
further evidence that wealthier countries have lower natural disaster mortality
rates. This research also aims to explain the discrepancies in data that may be
misleading. This chapter provides comparisons of the three case studies and their
governance, economic, and disaster planning variables. The comparisons of the
qualitative data is supplemented by the quantitative data of these three disasters.
Using quantitative and qualitative data these comparisons aim to solve the
existing questions about why some natural disasters are less devastating than
others and why certain variables seem to have effects on a country’s ability to
mitigate natural disasters.
First, it is crucial that the quantitative data is understood within the context
of each country. While a specific instance of an earthquake may look less severe
than another, in the context of the country as a whole, this data is seen differently.
Figure 2 below provides the raw data for the death toll, affected population, and
monetary damages. Objectively, it seems that El Salvador had the least
devastating earthquake as it suffered the least amount of devastation in all three
categories. However, Figure 2 provides a broader perspective on this data.
Figure 2:172
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Figure 3:173, 174, 175, 176

Figure 3 provides these variables in the context of the population sizes of
the affected area and the GDP of the countries during years of each earthquake.
This is important because countries that have smaller populations and GDPs are
going to have more difficulties bearing even relatively small devastations. While
the data on Haiti is astounding both in terms of raw data and comparatively, the
comparisons between the Mexico City and San Salvador earthquakes are much
clearer when seen in the context of population sizes and GDP. The information
provided by Figure 3 shows that Mexico and El Salvador’s death tolls were a lot
closer proportionally than Figure 2 suggests with Mexico’s death toll in regard to
population being lower than El Salvador’s. Additionally, there were a lot more
people significantly impacted by the earthquake in San Salvador compared to
Mexico City. Finally, the monetary damages were significantly more devastating
for El Salvador in comparison to their GDP than Mexico’s monetary damages.
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Although Mexico and El Salvador’s death tolls were relatively similar in
comparison to the population of the affected areas, the percentage of affected
people and monetary damages are important. As mentioned earlier, these
devastations are much more impactful on poorer countries because their
population lives closer to subsistence level and affected people are more likely to
remain displaced for a longer period of time. This can be seen in Haiti which has
the highest affected population compared to the population size of Port-au-Prince
and even affected some outside of the city. Even today, Haiti has a large number
of displaced people who live in temporary tent cities around Port-au-Prince.177
So what made Mexico able to prevent higher percentages of affected
people and monetary damages better than El Salvador? And why was Haiti so
dramatically affected by an earthquake of similar magnitude to the Mexico City
and San Salvador earthquakes? The following indicators hope to provide evidence
to answer these questions.
Governance
While Mexico has had a complex political history, leading up to the
earthquake, Mexico was relatively peaceful and a large majority of the population
was content with their leadership albeit weary due to the recent economic
crisis.178 On the other hand, El Salvador was in the midst of a civil war, and Haiti
was only a few years into Preval’s presidency after years of civil unrest. A
superficial evaluation of Haiti’s government would assume that it did not play a
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role in how devastated Port-au-Prince was. However, the effects of bad
government have a lasting impact.
It could be assumed that at the time of the earthquakes, the governments of
Haiti and El Salvador would have been more preoccupied with resolving their
current issues at hand rather than focusing on natural disaster preparedness which
was not viewed as critical at the time. Often natural disaster preparedness is dealt
with after most crucial issues are resolved. Therefore, if a country is in a state of
chaos or rebuilding, their focus is primarily on the conflict at hand or restoring the
essential elements to maintain peace and order. While natural disaster planning
should not be considered a nonessential element to government institutions, the
reality is that countries that struggle with everyday problems are probably less
likely to allocate their resources towards a crisis that seems distant.
Even though in countries like Haiti it may seem like their government is
improving, a closer look at their history of governance shows major institutional
damage that forced subsequent leaders to attend to more pressing issues.179 This is
why strictly quantitative data is not always indicative of reality. The government
of Haiti had made great strides with the election of Preval in 2006.180 Haiti
seemed to be making great improvements when Preval became the first president
to cede the presidency peacefully. However, Preval had the responsibility of
undoing the damage that all the presidents who had not peacefully ceded power
had done.181

179

Lundahl, "Political Economy of Reform Failure", 1-101
Dupuy, 132
181
Dupuy, 132, 133
180

41

Examples like Mexico in 1985 provide evidence that once a government is
able to maintain order for an extended period of time, they are able to choose to
extend their efforts towards areas of prevention to maintain this order. Because
the economy was rebounding from the debt crisis and there was no ongoing crisis,
policies did not have to be based around issues that would show immediate
results. Natural disaster planning, while valuable in the time of need, does not
show immediate results. This can discourage policymakers from allocating time
and resources towards disaster planning especially if they are concerned about
trying to maintain power and favorability.
Ultimately, governments seem to play a role in their countries’ ability to
handle an earthquake. In the evaluation of these case studies, what can be inferred
is that the longer that a government remains stable as well as the favorability of
the current regime play a role in the government’s likelihood in allocating time
and resources into natural disaster planning.
Economy
The impact of economic factors on a country to mitigate a natural disaster
is the most previously studied variable out of the variables included in this
research. However, this research provides a more in-depth analysis on this
variable beyond GDP. Quantitatively, Mexico had the healthiest economy with a
GDP of 195.22 billion, with El Salvador following with a GDP of 9.58 billion,
and lastly, Haiti with a GDP of 6.62 billion during the year of each of their
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earthquakes.182, 183, 184 A more qualitative study of these countries’ economies
during these periods supported the quantitative evidence. However, qualitative
research allows for more questions to be answered about the link between
economies and natural disasters.
Mexico’s ability to come back from its debt crisis was unprecedented for
the region.185 A few years after the crisis, whenever the earthquake struck, the
Mexican economy was rebounding from the 1983 debt crisis. The country did this
through more independent economic policies that cut imports.186 It could be
assumed that the lack of reliance on foreign assistance gave Mexico the freedom
to allocate resources where needed. While both the El Salvadoran and Haitian
economies depended on external aid, no industries in the Haitian economy have
been extremely successful, much less stable.187 Although El Salvador experienced
an earthquake in the middle of a civil war, its economy was prevented from
experiencing any negative growth during this war which began in 1980 through
the assistance of external aid.188 Unlike Haiti, this aid was used properly, and
therefore, it was able to keep the Salvadoran economy afloat. Although the
Haitian economy experienced growth during the years leading up to the
earthquake, other research on Haitian economics has concluded that this result
was more a factor of tightened expenditure policies and an increased revenue in
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the short run than of an increase in the quality of the lives of Haitian citizens.189
Further, Haiti was also plagued by lower employment rates, increasing inflation,
poor governance, and less purchasing power which pushed more Haitians into
poverty.190
One of the key differences when comparing the Mexican economy to the
Salvadoran and Hai tian economies was Mexico’s trade surplus which made it
less dependent on imports from other countries. After the debt crisis, Mexico
turned its trade deficit into a surplus as part of its economic recovery.191 Further,
the difference between El Salvador and Haiti’s economies was the historical
dependence on foreign debt. While El Salvador depended on foreign assistance
during its civil war, the country did not have a historical dependence on external
aid and was able to keep its economy from shrinking during the civil war time.
It could be assumed that economies had a role in these countries’ ability to
mitigate natural disasters. The freedom that Mexico had with its economy allowed
it to allocate resources freely. El Salvador and Haiti’s dependence on foreign aid
had disadvantages, such as the requirement that this aid be used in a way that was
satisfactory to the foreign lenders.192 This usually meant that the assistance had to
be allocated towards their economy or their exports.193 This might have prevented
the Salvadoran and Haitian governments from being able to invest into natural
disaster planning. This could be especially true for Haiti which has depended on
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foreign investment for many years.194 However, El Salvador experienced growth
in the couple of decades leading up to the earthquake suggesting that its economy
was on a healthy path until the disruption of the civil war.195 In contrast, Haiti’s
inability to find profitable industries and sustain them in order to grow
economically could have an effect on their willingness to allocate funding
towards resources that they considered nonessential.196
Disaster Planning
In comparison to the two other case studies, Mexico was the only country
that had a detailed disaster response plan.197 While El Salvador had the capacity
and capability to mobilize through their military, they were still preoccupied with
fighting the guerillas even after the shock hit San Salvador.198 El Salvador’s lack
of an emergency plan coupled with the military’s distraction from guerilla forces
made it hard to coordinate a response. However, once the Salvadoran military
were able to mobilize, they had the capability to provide aid using military grade
equipment and technology.
However, Haiti was the only country without a military. The initial
response time in Port-au-Prince was vastly longer than that of the other two case
studies.199 It could be assumed that the lack of capacity and capability that is
usually provided by the military could have been a cause for this lag in response.
Additionally, as previously mentioned, the police were not a trained and reliable
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source.200 This was very apparent by their lack of mobilization even days after the
shock.201 Military personnel are usually trained on how to mobilize even in the
face of destruction and disaster. However, the Haitian police were not given this
kind of training. Additionally, the Haitian police were concentrated in one area
unlike a military which usually has the ability to mobilize from other areas of the
country to assist in times of duress. This impacted the police’s ability to respond
because everyone in Port-au-Prince was affected.
Through the examination of these case studies, it can be assumed that
mobilization capacity and capability, which usually is performed through the
military, is an important factor in disaster response. If even local response teams
are not able to mobilize, when foreign response teams arrive, the response effort
will become very disorganized. Help from external organizations is useful, but is
it much more efficient and effective whenever it supports local efforts rather than
crafting its own. Additionally, it is important to establish a disaster response plan.
Although the Mexico City and San Salvador earthquakes are close in death tolls
in respect to the cities’ population sizes, Mexico City suffered much less in terms
of affected people and monetary damages. This could be attributed to their prior
disaster response efforts. No disaster plan can be created perfectly. Although they
had complications with organization, the establishment of a plan gave the local
response team a blueprint for the initial plan of action.
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Implications for the International Community
While some of these issues are complex to resolve, some of them could be
more effectively developed with the help of the international community.
Although external organizations and foreign actors have tried to assist the Central
American and Caribbean region in the past in regard to natural disaster
devastation, there are lessons that can be learned in order to help the region more
effectively.
Firstly, international organizations need to begin their disaster response
aid to these Central American and Caribbean countries before disaster even
strikes. The best way to assist these countries and avoid devastation is to assist
them in implementing the necessary measures to reduce risk. All of the factors
listed above require necessary action before a natural disaster strikes. Keeping this
in mind, if international organizations provide aid to a country, there needs to be
more freedom to allocate these funds towards prevention measures like
emergency management. If countries are unable to pay off their foreign debt, they
are usually bound by certain restrictions. This usually means that this assistance
has to be spent fixing immediate problems. However, natural disasters can
exacerbate any existing problems in the country, as illustrated by the Haiti
example. Additionally, since this region is so prone to natural disasters, while
emergency management may seem like a nonessential expense, it is necessary in
order to not cause further devastation to a region that already struggles
economically. Therefore, foreign organizations and nations that lend money to
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these countries should be lenient towards allowing for more natural disaster
response expenses.
Lastly, the international community should help Central American and
Caribbean countries expand their capacity in emergency management and
encourage countries to develop natural disaster response plans. As mentioned
earlier, many of these countries struggle economically and do not view emergency
management as essential in comparison to other demands. Therefore, they are less
likely to allocate resources towards it, especially if they are not confident that the
measures they are taking will be effective. This provides opportunity for external
organizations and other nations to educate these countries about proper
emergency management measures. If the international community is able to
provide the Central America and Caribbean region with more education about
emergency management, funds for natural disaster planning, and more freedom to
allocate towards measures they believe will reduce devastation, the negative
impact of natural disasters in this area of the world could be decreased.
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY
Summary of Findings
Having examined the findings from all three case studies, it could be
inferred that a country is more likely to be able mitigate a natural disaster well if it
has a history of stability within its government, the people favor the government
in power, it is more independent economically, it has a military, and finally, that it
has a prior disaster response plan. While previous studies have examined the
relationship that economies and governance have with natural disaster deaths, the
study of specific elements of disaster response and emergency management is a
topic with very little research or empirical studies.
The figures below evaluate the disaster response according to the criteria
given in Harrald’s Preparedness and Prevention phase and Initial Reaction and
Mobilization phase of his criteria for successful disaster response.
Figure 4:

Figure 5:

As illustrated in Figure 4, Mexico demonstrated more crucial elements of the
Preparedness and Prevention stage than the other two case studies. Mexico’s DN-
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3 was its Mobilization and Response Plan.202 Mexico’s disaster plan also
demonstrated its Mobilization Capacity and Capability and its ability to obtain
Adequate Resources in natural disaster events prior to the 1986 earthquake.
However, many of Mexico’s losses can be attributed to the lack of
Interorganizational Communication due to the lack of coordination between the
municipality of Mexico City and the federal government. El Salvador had a much
less developed Preparedness and Prevention plan for natural disaster than Mexico.
The only elements that El Salvador demonstrated were Interorganizational
Communication and Mobilization Capacity and Capability. El Salvador had the
Interorganizational Communication factor because external organizations, such as
the CIE and UNT, were part of the plan developed by the government before the
disaster occured.203 El Salvador also had the Mobilization Capacity and
Capability through their military. Although the military was slightly delayed in
their response, they were able to provide assistance to the local and foreign effort.
Lastly, Haiti’s only element in the Preparedness and Prevention stage was their
Mobilization and Response Plan. However, the existence of this plan was
overshadowed by the lack of interorganizational coordination. While there were
external organizations, such as the Haitian Red Cross, that would have assisted
Haiti in a disaster response effort, the lack of clarity made it difficult for these
organizations to provide financial much less physical assistance.
Figure 5 compares elements of each country’s initial response and
evaluates them according to Harrald’s criteria. Mexico had all of Harrald’s crucial
202
203

Dynes, 21
Bommer, 94
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elements. The country was able to accomplish this through helicopter and bus
tours around the city that allowed response teams to survey the damage.204 The
large amount of human and material resources that the military could employ
meant that Mexico had Resources in Place prior to the earthquake. Finally,
Mexico military’s response to previous natural disasters allowed it to take these
resources and have a realistic approach to Resource Mobilization. These
comparisons can be used to gain more insight into the important factors that
constitute an effective natural disaster plan, specifically in the Central American
and Caribbean context.
Conclusions
By using both quantitative and qualitative data, this research was able to
gain a better insight into the factors that affect natural disasters in the Central
American and Caribbean region. There are lessons that can be learned from this
research that can be applied to this region which needs to increase its efforts in
emergency management. Central America and the Caribbean have struggled with
poor economies and unstable governments for decades, so although maintaining
the economy in preparation for a natural disaster is unlikely, the impact that
disaster response plans have on the death toll and monetary damages is hopeful.
These plans do not have to be very complex, but rather based on informed
decisions with high importance placed on communication and coordination within
the response teams. Two of Harrald’s preparedness and prevention factors,
Domain Awareness and Detection Capability that are created and maintained as

204

Dynes, 30
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well as Mobilization and Response Plans cannot be effective unless they are based
on realistic scenarios, focusing on the need to be informed. While investment may
need to be placed into detection capabilities, domain awareness could be done
without technology and instead through implementing a plan for prompt
communication from affected and surrounding areas. The mobilization and
response plans based on realistic scenarios requires an informed disaster response
planning team prior to the occurrence of the disaster. This information could
come from previous disasters, but should also take into consideration the possible
occurrence of an infrequent kind of disaster, based on the country’s geographical
positioning.
The need for mobilization capacity and capability that can adequately
meet the needs of people in affected areas is an important factor but could be a
barrier to successful disaster preparedness and prevention in poor Central
American countries due to the lack of investment. However, many of these
countries already rely on external organizations for assistance in their disaster
relief efforts. Therefore, if external organizations in the country have the adequate
capacity and capability to deliver large amounts of resources post-disaster, there
should be coordination pre-disaster with these groups and also pre-planned
communication between all external groups and the local government. Adequate
resources for high threat areas during the initial response is also a factor that
requires investment, but it should not be discounted as out of the capability of
these Latin American countries. Many international organizations are eager to
send resources, such as medical and disaster recovery supplies. The mobilization
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of international resources in the form of doctors or other non-material resources
may be slower and less optimal than using native resources, but if a plan is
already implemented this process could be more efficiently optimized. With the
United States being so close to Central America and the Caribbean, if prior plans
were made before disaster struck, many aid organizations within the U.S., and
possibly the U.S. government, would be willing to assist in the disaster recovery
and could be in the affected countries relatively quickly when needed. This is
connected to Harrald’s last factor for success in disaster preparedness and
prevention: interorganizational coordination that is preplanned. Coordination is
such a key factor in disaster response. Although many Central American and
Caribbean countries do not have the available investment to gain resources
needed for disaster recovery, there are many other organizations that are willing
to help. If these organizations are utilized wisely and preemptively put into the
disaster response plans, with the use of coordination between the country’s
available resources and external resources, an effective disaster response is
achievable.
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